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Kvanvig’s routes to this destination, I applaud and welcome his two most
important bottom-line contentions: first that epistemologists should think
more about the value of knowledge and other epistemic states, and second
that what normative epistemology should really be after is not knowledge, but understanding.
NOTES
1. Thus, in eﬀect, Kvanvig: “Attending to the relationship between knowledge and understanding can give us hope in our pursuit of special and unique
value for epistemic achievements, even though we have had to give up such
hope regarding the cognitive achievement of knowledge” (p. 186). Cp. Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato: “A better understanding of knowledge is the precondition for solving the problem of false judgement (p. 200c–d).”
2. This is my gloss, prompted by comparison with other contexts, where
Kvanvig very frequently contrasts accounts of the nature with accounts of the
value of knowledge. If there is a misprint here, it is not, unfortunately, the only
one. (p. 13 “Daedelus” for “Daedalus”; p. 30 “Buryeat” for “Burnyeat”; on p.
201 we have “laudatory” where the context demands “laudable,” on p. 108
the non-word “virtuousity”; on p. 193 it is disappointing to find Cambridge
University Press, of all people, misspelling the Greek epistêmê.)
3. However we translate epistêmê. Kvanvig rightly points out that “knowledge” may actually be a less accurate translation for what Plato has in mind
than “understanding” (p. 193). “Science” (in a broad sense, like the German
Wissenschaft) might also be more accurate than “knowledge.”

The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, edited by Brian Davies and Brian
Leftow. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 323 pages. $65.00 cloth/$29.99
paper.
SARAH BORDEN, Wheaton College (IL)
The Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Anselm begins by describing Anselm of Canterbury as “at once one of the best- and leastknown of medieval thinkers” (p. 1). This volume of the Cambridge Companion series does an excellent job of both oﬀering substantive pieces
on the topics for which Anselm is already so well known (most notably,
the ontological argument) and introducing readers to those for which
he is not, but arguably ought to be. As the authors make clear, there is a
breadth and passion to Anselm’s thought that can often be missed when
simply reading Anselm as a set up for contemporary debate regarding
God’s existence.
There are twelve essays in this text, a substantive bibliography, and
an index. Among the notable strengths of the volume is the spectrum of
topics covered: biography, philosophy of language, modality, freedom,
ethical theory, as well as theological topics including the Trinity and the
atonement. Significant as well is the variety of approaches. Peter King’s essay, “Anselm’s philosophy of language,” provides an analysis of Anselm’s
texts on the topic. King writes, “[Anselm] takes up issues in the philosophy
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of language in nearly everything he wrote” [84]), and King ends with a
comparison with more modern conceptions. In contrast, Simo Knuuttila’s “Anselm on modality” explicitly focuses on the context of Anselm’s
thought, tracing the critical sources and comparing Anselm’s view with
many of his own contemporaries. Like Knuuttila, Gareth Matthews’s essay
(“Anselm, Augustine, and Platonism”) focuses on Anselm in his historical
context, but with an emphasis on (albeit somewhat cursory) comparison
between Augustine’s and Anselm’s thought on a few select topics.
It is a strength of the volume that it includes both essays which read
Anselm in his contemporary context and essays which place Anselm in
the context of more modern debates. Perhaps the most successful at emphasizing Anselm’s relevance for modern debate while not allowing interpretation of Anselm to be limited by modern categories is Sandra Visser’s
and Thomas Williams’s discussion of Anselm on freedom. Visser and
Williams open by noting reactions contemporary metaphysicians would
likely have to Anselm’s definition of freedom (they say of Anselm’s definition of freedom of choice as ‘the power to preserve rectitude of will for
the sake of that rectitude itself’: “From the point of view of contemporary
metaphysics, this is one of the most unhelpful definitions imaginable” [p.
179]). Throughout the essay, they point to places in Anselm’s texts where
modern readers are likely to be perplexed, and they use this perplexity as
an opportunity to explicate the subtlety of Anselm’s analysis of the various types and meanings of freedom. It is an essay that left me wanting
more, suspecting that there are even more resources to mine in Anselm’s
reflections on a topic so important to contemporary thought.
Among the striking and important theses argued for is that of Jeﬀrey
E. Brower. In the opening paragraph of Brower’s “Anselm on ethics,” he
writes: “Although it is easy to overlook the systematic nature of Anselm’s
ethical theorizing, as well as its genuine originality, his contribution to
medieval ethical theory is considerable” (p. 222). Brower argues that “Anselm’s theory is deontological in nature: unlike the eudaimonism characteristic of this period, it separates morality from happiness (at least conceptually) and emphasizes the need for agents to be motivated by justice
rather than happiness” (p. 223). In doing this, Anselm ought to be given
credit that is usually reserved for Duns Scotus; Anselm breaks with the
Aristotelian tradition in ethics and thereby makes a substantive contribution to the development of ethical theory.
Although topically and methodologically varied, the volume also exhibits a deep coherence. Several themes are picked up and repeated in
numerous essays; the most obvious of which is a key theme introduced
in the first biographical chapter: correctness (rectitudo). (Unfortunately,
the index does not cite well the recurrence of the idea.) Correctness for
Anselm is not merely technical exactitude or a correspondence between
mind and thing. Rather, correctness has to do fitting into a whole, possessing a kind of harmony, and doing what a person or thing was meant
to do. Thus, for example, in evaluating the truth of a statement, we ought
not to be concerned simply with its correspondence but also its correctness—that is, doing the kind of thing a statement is to do. The concern for
rectitudo recurs regularly, and the diﬀerent essays reveal multiple facets in
Anselm’s use of the term.
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Perhaps somewhat less surprising, given the skill of our editors, the
two essays touching most directly on the ontological argument fit well
together and into the volume as a whole, and they provide a substantive discussion of Anselm’s most famous proof. Brian Leftow in “Anselm’s
perfect-being theology” summarizes Anselm’s project: “Roughly speaking, Anselm is trying to find descriptions that apply to God and would
still have described Him even if only He existed” (p. 134), in contrast, for
example, with the notion of God as Creator. Leftow provides an important clarification about why Anselm approaches questions of God in the
way that he does and thus prepares us to engage rightly in the ontological
argument. Brian Davies’s essay on that argument (“Anselm and the ontological argument”) is, as one would expect, a model of clarity.
After complimenting the editors for great success at what is surely a difficult task—bringing together a coherent but broad and varied volume on
a thinker such as Anselm—it may seem a bit nit-picky to complain about a
single infelicitous phrase in the Introduction. But perhaps the emphasis will
highlight what the editors have accomplished. Davies and Leftow write in
the Introduction that Anselm can be taken as a philosopher insofar as we
understand a philosopher as “someone concerned to argue for conclusions
in a cogent way” (p. 2). Surely Anselm was concerned to argue and do so
cogently, but, as numerous essays in the volume show well, such thin ideals do not capture the depth and richness of Anselm’s own vision of what
theoretical and philosophical activity is about. The volume makes clear
that Anselm is a passionate thinker, convinced that truth is transformative
and that reflection on fundamental issues, especially God and the soul, is
part of piety to God. To focus on the cogency of the arguments without
also attending to the quality and attitude of the soul making the arguments
and the transformative nature of the topics studied, is to construe what
it means to be a rational, reasoning human being in a way quite diﬀerent
from how Anselm would. Theoretical reflection is about seeking truth, but
truth for Anselm is not something that can be divided into parts. There are
not many truths, but one truth. Thus the pursuit of truth does not involve
a limited aspect of oneself (e.g., certain cognitive faculties) but includes the
full transformation of the person. It is a vision foreign to modern ears but
rich with resources—which makes this volume all the more welcome.

Duns Scotus on God, by Richard Cross. Ashgate Studies in the History of
Philosophical Theology, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, 2005.
289 pages.
JOHN KRONEN, The University of St. Thomas, St. Paul
This is a well researched, well written, and well argued book on an important topic. Cross has succeeded admirably in a diﬃcult task—explaining
enough of Scotus’s complex philosophy to allow those unfamiliar with
either Scotus’s thought or medieval philosophy in general to follow, reasonably well, the arguments Scotus oﬀers on a range of diﬃcult questions
in natural and philosophical theology.

